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Learning an accurate representation of the environment is a difficult task for both animals
and humans, because the causal structures of the environment are unobservable and must
be inferred from the observable input. In this article, we argue that this difficulty is further
increased by the multi-context nature of realistic learning environments. When the environ-
ment undergoes a change in context without explicit cueing, the learner must detect the
change and employ a new causal model to predict upcoming observations correctly. We
discuss the problems and strategies that a rational learner might adopt and existing find-
ings that support such strategies. We advocate hierarchical models as an optimal structure
for retaining causal models learned in past contexts, thereby avoiding relearning familiar
contexts in the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Learning requires a mechanism that infers from observable events
in the environment a minimally sufficient hypothesis of the unob-
servable underlying structures. This hypothesis not only serves as
an efficient representation of the causal relations in the environ-
ment, at least for a particular task, but also enables the learner
to generalize to events that have not been observed. For exam-
ple, if the task involves predicting the consumption of different
food items in a school cafeteria, then a reasonable approximation
is to tally the quantity of each food item that was consumed over
some running average of the past (e.g., the prior month). However,
there is considerable variation in these tallies across hours of the
day, days of the week, and specific occasions such as holidays. Thus,
in order to prevent more than the occasional dissatisfied customer,
the manager of the cafeteria must develop a fairly flexible model
that can modulate its predictions of the demand for food items
dynamically given the values of these key variables. We will refer
to these key variables as contexts and the cafeteria environment as
an example of a multi-context environment. Each context in such
an environment is associated with a distinctive causal structure. In
the present article, we argue that most realistic environments are
inherently multi-context, and that learning a flexible model that
embeds information about contexts is the general task that con-
fronts naïve learners. To successfully accomplish this task, learners
must be able to (1) infer (with uncertainty) whether a context
change has occurred; (2) adapt to a changed context and learn
new causal models if necessary; and (3) represent contexts along
with corresponding causal models in an optimal manner.
Context changes often signal that a different underlying causal
model now applies. However, contexts are rarely explicitly labeled
in the input available to the learner, and many contextual cues
that are easily observable are not relevant to the underlying causal
model. The canonical case, then, involves implicit contexts that
must be discerned by the learner, often by noting that the current
causal model does not provide an adequate fit with the most recent
input. Thus, the first challenge of learning in a multi-context
environment is to detect context changes from unexpected obser-
vations alone. This would be a trivial problem if the causal relations
within each context were strictly deterministic. Consider the cafe-
teria example again. If the consumption rate of bottled milk during
breakfast hours is exactly 10 bottles per minute, it is not difficult
to conclude that breakfast is over when the rate drops to 1 bot-
tle per minute. However, such deterministic relations are rare in
reality. It is possible that the average consumption rate of bottled
milk is 10 bottles per minute during the breakfast context, but
occasionally, it might be as low as 2 bottles or as high as 20. The
uncertainty resulting from random and probabilistic variations
creates a difficult situation for the manager: if a large lecture class,
originally scheduled at 9 A.M., is canceled because the professor’s
return flight from a conference is delayed by bad weather, then the
demand for milk at the cafeteria may be altered idiosyncratically –
the manager may observe a decrease as students are likely to get
up later and skip breakfast. Unaware of the implicit context (i.e.,
class canceled), the manager is now faced with the problem of
contextual ambiguity : should the manager interpret this decrease
as acceptable random variations in the regular breakfast context
or as the representative characteristic of a changed context?
Resolving contextual ambiguity is only the first step of learn-
ing in a multi-context environment. Once a learner arrives at the
conclusion that a different context has come into effect, they must
also decide how to adapt to the changed context. Here, a learner
has at least two choices. They can either learn a new model and
associate it with the context, or retrieve from memory a causal
model learned for a past context, which closely resembles or even
matches the current context. The need to learn a new causal model
arises when the learner encounters a novel context. Consider a new
manager of a school cafeteria. Although the new manager may
draw upon her experience of working in a cafeteria at a different
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university, there remains the possibility of encountering novel con-
texts on the current campus. For example, students at the current
university may prefer sleeping in over attending classes on Friday
mornings, which would require reduced stocking of bottled milk
on those days. Like a naïve learner in any task, the new manager
not only has to learn the average quantity of milk to stock (i.e., the
model), but also has to associate it with Friday mornings (i.e., the
appropriate context). The difficulty lies in the fact that there are
often no explicit cues for the manager to gain sudden insight into
what the appropriate context is: Instead of using friday morning,
the manager could just as easily consider the weather on that par-
ticular day. The benefits of identifying the appropriate contexts,
on the other hand, also extend to the second choice of adapting to
the change in context: reusing a learned model. If the learner has
correctly associated the causal model (e.g., decreased demand for
bottled milk) with the relevant context (e.g., friday morning),
then, in theory, they will be able to retrieve and reinstate the model
when the target context is effective again (e.g., next Friday).
Assuming that the learner has the ability to reinstate a previ-
ously learned causal model, does it mean that the learner must be
capable of storing and representing multiple contexts simultane-
ously? Although intuitively, the answer to this question has to be a
strong “yes” (since learning a new causal model should not lead to
elimination of an old one), it is not immediately transparent how
these multiple contexts and their corresponding causal models are
organized in the mind of the learner. Are contexts represented
without order, as in “a bag of contexts/models,” or are they struc-
turally organized? For example, do learners represent the relations
between different contexts so that the changes in one context may
be generalized to another? A rational approach might predict that
contexts with similar causal models are clustered to achieve an effi-
cient representation as well as to highlight the relationships among
contexts. How can these intuitions be captured in a formal model
for learning in multi-context environments?
In the rest of this article, we integrate existing findings that
are relevant to the issue of learning in a multi-context environ-
ment. Our primary goal is to offer a comprehensive overview that
brings together insights from across various literatures of cogni-
tive science, so that one may come to realize what is yet to be
investigated and understood. To avoid potential confusions, we
distinguish the multi-context learning environment we are inter-
ested in from the partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP) that often concerns the reinforcement learning com-
munity (Stankiewicz et al., 2006; Gureckis and Love, 2009; Knox
et al., 2011). In a POMDP problem, the environment implic-
itly transits from one state to another as a function of its past
states and subjects’ actions. The learner must infer the current
state they are in and how states change in order to take appro-
priate actions and maximize gains. Despite the apparent similarity
between“state” and our notion of a“context,” a POMDP by itself is
not a multi-context environment. This is because once the learner
has successfully discovered the representation of the underlying
Markov process, they will have an optimal, and most importantly,
stable solution for maximizing gains over time, as long as the
underlying Markov process does not change. Our discussion here,
as illustrated by the cafeteria example, focuses on exactly the oppo-
site case: that the underlying process, be it a Markov process or a
simple generative model without temporal dependencies, changes
unpredictably over time, rendering any previously learned model
insufficient for the new context.
Additionally, we outline the directions for future research. How
the learner determines when a change in context is relevant and
then learns a new causal theory must, we claim, involve building
hierarchical models (or heuristic approximations of them). Such
a hierarchical model must include the storage of multiple contexts
so that the unexpected input serves as a trigger to shift from one
causal model to another, rather than simply updating the current
model to improve the fit. Finally, we hypothesize that contexts
themselves are structurally rich components that may share cues,
so that it is possible to infer whether the environment has returned
to a previous context at the time of a context change.
2. DETECTING A CONTEXT CHANGE
In a realistic learning task, the learner has to rely on observations
that unfold over time to form hypotheses about the environment.
If the environment consists of a single-context, the sequential
nature of the input is less likely to be a problem since an opti-
mal learning strategy, as prescribed by Bayesian belief updating,
is available (for general discussions on Bayesian modeling of cog-
nition, see Griffiths et al., 2008; Jones and Love, 2011). Similarly,
if the learner is given explicit information regarding which con-
text they are currently in, there are no contextual ambiguities to
solve. However, in most cases (such as the cafeteria example), the
environment might change from one context to another implic-
itly, leaving the learner with the difficult task of estimating where
one context ends and another one begins. The difficulty is further
compounded by the sequential availability of the input – recog-
nizing the emergence of a different context must be achieved in an
on-line manner rather than with post hoc analysis. Detecting con-
text changes is commonly referred to as a change detection problem
in many studies (e.g., Behrens et al., 2007; Yu, 2007).
While monitoring for unexpected observations in the input is
an intuitive strategy for detecting context changes, at the core is
the problem of interpreting ambiguity in the unexpected data: they
can be interpreted as outliers if we assume the environment is still
in the same context as before, or, they can also be interpreted as
representative samples of a new context that is already in effect. As
mentioned in the Introduction, we refer to this type of ambiguity
as contextual ambiguity. How do learners resolve contextual ambi-
guity? Can they do so optimally? A satisfying answer to these ques-
tions requires a definition of optimality in the context of resolving
contextual ambiguity. We discuss the factors that have been shown
to influence how the learner resolves contextual ambiguity before
presenting our definition of optimal ambiguity resolution.
2.1. PREDICTION ERROR
Prediction error is widely recognized as one factor that can be
used to adjudicate between outliers versus a true context change.
In typical experimental settings, prediction error is either explic-
itly signaled by the degree of reduction in reward on a trial-by-trial
basis (i.e., the utility of an action; Behrens et al., 2007; Pearson et al.,
2009; Nassar et al., 2010) or assumed to be (subconsciously) com-
puted by learners who seek to optimize overall task performance
(in which case the utility of the action is not explicitly known;
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e.g., Fine et al., 2010, submitted). Large prediction errors, espe-
cially when they persist over time, often imply a change in context,
while small prediction errors are likely to be random deviations
in the current context. Thus, on average, learners will resolve con-
textual ambiguity faster when the new context differs greatly from
the previous context. In the animal conditioning literature, the
partial reinforcement extinction effect describes exactly that situ-
ation – after the extinction of reward, animals stop displaying the
conditioned behavior more quickly when the behavior was trained
with a high reward rate than with a low reward rate (Tarpy, 1982;
Pearce et al., 1997). Going from a high reward rate environment to
the extinction stage results in larger prediction errors than going
from a low reward rate environment. Similarly, during foraging,
animals tend to stop visiting a depleted food source more quickly
if the source location was previously associated with a high return
of food (Kacelnik et al., 1987; Dall et al., 1999).
When human learners are tested in a similar experimental par-
adigm known as the “bandit game,” which features sequential
choices among several alternatives with various reward rates, they
tend to show higher learning rates when experimenters change
reward rates without announcing the changes (Behrens et al.,
2007; for similar results obtained from another experimental par-
adigm, see Nassar et al., 2010). Intuitively, high learning rates
can accelerate the process of learning a new causal model, which
helps quickly minimize the ongoing prediction error. The more
important finding is, however, that the learning rate positively
correlates with the magnitude of prediction error, where predic-
tion error is measured in terms of either the utilities of actions
(such as the difference between expected reinforcement and the
reinforcement actually received; e.g., Courville et al., 2006) or the
accuracy of directly predicting variables of interest (e.g., Nassar
et al., 2010). This implies that human learners potentially react
to context changes in an optimal (or at least near-optimal) fash-
ion: with small prediction errors, the learner adjusts their current
behavior conservatively since small errors are likely to be random
variations; with large prediction errors, the learner adopts a high
learning rate to catch up with what is probably a changed context.
Such behaviors can be qualitatively predicted by rational models
that anneal learning rates based on the magnitudes of prediction
errors, such as the Kalman filter. In experiments where the nor-
mality assumption of the Kalman filter does not apply (Yu and
Cohen, 2008) have successfully applied the linear-exponential fil-
ter to describe subjects’ behaviors in a multi-context categorical
learning task.
Converging evidence for the role of prediction error is also
provided by imaging and multi-electrode recording studies. It has
been suggested that the brain region known as the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC) represents prediction errors at the time of
outcome (see Yu, 2007; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008, for reviews
and opinions on the role of ACC) or related quantities (e.g., the
“volatility” of an environment; Behrens et al., 2007). More recent
studies also suggested that the neurons in the ACC may be more
accurately described as tracking the surprisal of an event rather
than the magnitudes of reward prediction errors per se (e.g., Hay-
den et al., 2011). In other words, the ACC seems to be involved
in accurately predicting upcoming events, rather than reacting to
changes in the utilities of actions in the environment.
In the above scenarios, the information about prediction error
is assumed to be immediately available once the learner has made a
decision. However, there are other cases where such an assumption
does not hold. For example, when prediction errors are derived
from rewards, the learner will experience delayed prediction errors
if rewards are given out in batches rather than on a trial-by-trial
basis. How should the learner detect a context change in these sit-
uations? If learners adopt the same strategy as in an environment
with immediate feedback, the overall loss will likely be widened
because the incorrect causal model will be applied for a much
longer period of time. So far, little empirical research has been
conducted to investigate what kinds of strategies learners actually
use to detect context changes in an environment coupled with
delayed prediction errors.
2.2. ESTIMATION UNCERTAINTY
Although large and small prediction errors are correlated with dif-
ferent presumed explanations for outliers, there are two types of
prediction errors that are worth distinguishing. In the first case, the
learner makes a substantial number of prediction errors because
a good model of the environment has not yet been formed. Those
prediction errors are the result of random guessing and are thus
unhelpful for the purpose of resolving contextual ambiguity. The
other type of prediction error arises when the learner is confident
that the current causal model has been sufficiently refined to be a
good theory for the current context, and then becomes genuinely
surprised by the inadequate fit with the most recent input. From
the rational decision-making perspective, only this second type of
prediction error is meaningful to the learner (the solution to the
former is simply to collect more data). However, its effect might
seem counter-intuitive to those who are familiar with the Kalman
filter. In the Kalman filter, the influence of a large prediction error
will be lessened if the observer is confident about current esti-
mates. Yet, this balance between prediction error and estimation
uncertainty is only rational if the environment is assumed to be sta-
tionary. When there is more than one context in the environment,
large prediction errors at the time of low estimation uncertainty
should indicate the emergence of new contexts. To test this hypoth-
esis, one expects that when facing a particularly difficult task (due
to either complexity or limited sampling), learners will be less likely
to reach a low-uncertainty estimate of the current causal model,
and they will consequently fail to recognize new contexts as easily
as they have done in the studies reviewed above.
Unfortunately, none of the studies that we are aware of have
addressed this issue directly within a single experimental par-
adigm. However, an artificial language learning experiment has
provided some interesting insights. In Gebhart et al. (2009), learn-
ers listen to two artificial languages presented successively in a
single session (with equal amount of exposure and without an
overtly signaled change point). Under these conditions, only the
first language is learned. The crucial difference between artificial
grammar learning paradigms and simple decision-making tasks
(such as the bandit games in Behrens et al., 2007) is that learners
in the latter environment are able to reach asymptotic performance
relatively effortlessly. On the contrary, learners cannot easily reach
asymptotic performance in an artificial grammar learning exper-
iment due to the high-dimensional nature of the linguistic input
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(Gerken, 2010). Therefore, the high uncertainty associated with
the model of the first language prevents the learners from resolving
the contextual ambiguity and learning a second grammar. Another
experiment, in which subjects were tested with a variant of the
famous Wisconsin Card Sorting task, showed that learners failed
to detect when the sorting game entered a new context (charac-
terized by changes in the reward rules) as optimally as a Bayesian
learner (Wilson and Niv,2012). Presumably, this is also because it is
difficult to reach low estimation uncertainty when context changes
result in structural differences in the causal relations, which is a
more demanding learning task. Future studies, however, must test
the hypothesis of estimation uncertainty directly within a single
experimental paradigm to further our understanding of this issue.
2.3. PRIOR EXPECTATION FOR CONTEXT CHANGE
What happens if learners approach the problem of resolving con-
textual ambiguity with a bias toward looking for changes in con-
text? Put differently, will believing that there are multiple contexts
prior to learning improve the recognition of changes? A variant
of the foregoing artificial language learning experiment was con-
ducted, where not only the subjects knew that there would be two
languages (i.e., contexts), but also they experienced a 30-s silent
pause between these two languages (Gebhart et al., 2009). With this
change, subjects readily learned both languages. The bias toward
changes can also be introduced by the use of more subtle explicit
cues (e.g., subjects learn separate models when each context is
coupled with a speaker-voice cue: Weiss et al., 2009), or by famil-
iarizing learners with the pattern of a multi-context environment
prior to conducting the target trials (Gallistel et al., 2001). These
findings suggest that the prior expectation for a change in context
enhances the ability of recognizing context changes in subsequent
sequential input.
Is having a prior expectation for changes in context beneficial
for learning in realistic and ecologically valid environments? This
is largely an empirical question that awaits further experimental
investigation (see Green et al., 2010 for relevant discussions). The-
oretically, it is not difficult to see that such a prior expectation
is only advantageous when it matches the frequency of context
changes in the environment. If the prior expectation for context
change is comparatively weak, learners would simply ignore con-
textual ambiguity and miss the new context. However, if it is too
strong, learners may effectively treat each minor deviation as a
signal for a new context in the environment – thus over fitting the
data. In that case, no stable learning can be achieved.
The ideal solution for the learner would be to estimate the
frequency of context changes in the environment before learn-
ing begins. However, such a strategy is only possible when the
learner is familiar with the task environment and can anticipate
the start of the learning process. Estimating the frequency of con-
text changes in a novel environment, whose cues and features are
entirely different from what the learner has encountered before,
is indeterminate because there is no certainty about the type of
changes and when they occur. The question of interest is then:
how strong a prior the learner has for context changes in these
novel environments? While experimental evidence on this issue
is thin, we do know that prior expectations for context change,
in the absence of explicit instruction from the experimenter or
explicit cues from the environment, must be relatively moderate.
Such insights come from experiments where the context of the
environment alternates frequently, resulting in an unrealistically
volatile causal structure. In those conditions, learning is either vir-
tually non-existent (Clapper and Bower, 2002) or substituted by a
heuristic strategy that heavily depends on recent exemplars (Sum-
merfield et al., 2011). The tendency of preferring locally stable and
coherent observations is also seen in young infants: in the absence
of suggestive information, infants are more likely to assume that a
sequence of observations consists of correlated samples with com-
mon properties rather than independent samples randomly drawn
from the whole population (Gweon et al., 2010).
3. ADAPTING TO THE CHANGED CONTEXT
Once a context change is hypothesized to have occurred, the
learner must decide how to adapt to the changed context. If the
context is novel, the learner has no choices other than to infer a set
of new causal relations from observations. If the context is familiar,
however, the learner may retrieve from memory the causal model
of a past context and use it to predict future observations (c.f.
Freidin and Kacelnik, 2011). Instead of discussing both scenarios
directly (which we will cover slightly later), here we focus on two
theoretical assumptions that must be in place to make these sce-
narios possible: the capacity of storing multiple contexts and the
organization of these contexts in memory.
3.1. IN WITH THE NEW, WHILE RETAINING THE OLD?
When the environment presents a novel context, a new causal
model should be generated to represent the dependencies between
the variables of interest. To achieve this goal, the learner can either
update the current causal model, parametrically or structurally,
or learn a second model that will co-exist in parallel with the
previous one. Existing accounts, such as associative strength the-
ories (e.g., the Rescorla–Wagner model; Rescorla and Wagner,
1972) or reinforcement learning models (see Payzan-LeNestour
and Bossaerts, 2011 for an example), have typically assumed the
former theoretical position. Such a theoretical position is also
shared by the more recently proposed change detection models
(see Box 1) and sequential sampling models (see Box 2), both of
which are intended to explain how ideal learners should behave in
multi-context tasks.
However, disrupting or erasing the causal model learned under
a past context (also known as catastrophic interference in con-
nectionist terms; French, 1999) might not be a rational choice,
especially when the environment may revert back to a past con-
text. Experimental findings suggest that animals and humans do
not simply abandon knowledge of past contexts. For example, in
conditioning experiments, animals that have gone through extinc-
tion still possess a trace of the learned dependencies between
the conditioned stimulus and response, which can spontaneously
recover (e.g., Sissons and Miller, 2009), be renewed (e.g., Bouton
and King, 1983), or be reinstated (e.g., Thanellou and Green, 2011)
under the right conditions. Adult barn owls can rapidly re-adapt
to an abnormal association between auditory cues and locations
in visual space if they have previously learned such abnormal
audio-visual dependencies when they were young (Knudsen, 1998;
Linkenhoker et al., 2005). Humans also routinely switch back and
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Box 1 Bayesian change detection models.
Detecting a change in context is an important step in learning a rich representation of a multi-context environment.The traditional approach
to change detection comes from studies of controlled stochastic processes (e.g., Shiryaev, 1978), where the goal is to find an optimal policy
for mapping observations to stopping decisions (i.e., whether or not to consider that a context has ended). While the solutions are useful
for many engineering applications, it is often difficult to attach a cognitive interpretation to the algorithms used in those solutions.
Here we focus on the Bayesian change detection approach that has recently become popular in the cognitive science community. As a
computational-level theory, these models describe how a rational observer should learn a causal model given a particular formulation of
the problem (Marr, 1982). Consider a simple scenario where the goal is to predict the number of automobiles that pass through a given
intersection in each 24-h period.The parameter of interest is θ, which refers to the number of automobiles being driven from point A to point
B. The causal model to be discovered by the learner specifies the relation between the parameter θ and the observation y, the number of
automobiles passing through the intersection. However, at any given time step, a change in context might happen (e.g., road construction),
which will alter the previous relation in effect and yield unexpected observations. Detecting the change then depends on how likely the
learner is to attribute the unexpected observations to a change in the value of θ. The change detection approach assumes the determining
factor here is the learner’s expectation of the volatility of θ. If θ is assumed to be changing smoothly and with little variance (i.e., non-volatile),
then learners will tend to view unexpected observations as outliers and keep the value of θ unchanged. If θ is assumed to be capable of
abrupt changes of substantial magnitude, learners will more likely update the value of θ when observing unexpected data.
Formally, the volatility of an environment, represented by a hyper-parameter α, can range from 0 to 1: With probability α, θt will be the same
value as θt−1; with probability 1− α, θt will be randomly drawn from a predefined reset distribution p0. Thus, if α is 1, then learners are
essentially assuming a single-context environment, where the value of θ is the same at each time step. If its value is 0, then learners are
essentially assuming a completely chaotic multi-context environment, where the value of θ at the preceding time step has no predictive
value over the current time step at all. Any intermediate value reflects the degree to which learners are biased against single-context
environments. Additionally, the value of α, i.e., the degree of volatility, can change over time as well.
This model gained its popularity due to its conceptual simplicity and the range of phenomena it can explain (Cho et al., 2002;Yu and Cohen,
2008; Wilder et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2010; see also Nassar et al., 2010; Mathys et al., 2011) for variants that are claimed to be cognitively
more plausible; and (Summerfield et al., 2011; Wilson and Niv, 2012) for cases where the Bayesian change detection model is not the best
descriptor of human behavior). A significant drawback of this class of models, however, lies in its memory-less learning mechanism. Once
the ideal learner detects a change in context, it learns the new parameter settings by overriding those of the old context.This is undesirable
since animal and human learners have clearly demonstrated the ability of holding onto knowledge learned from past contexts.
Box 2 Sequential sampling methods.
Sequential sampling models are another approach to learning in multi-context environments. These models are inspired by sequential
Monte Carlo sampling techniques, which are commonly used to approximate Bayesian inference in analytically non-tractable problems. In
the cognitive science community, the particle filter, one of the most common sequential sampling algorithms (e.g., Sanborn et al., 2010),
has been successfully applied to learning tasks where there are changes in context (Brown and Steyvers, 2009). In a particle filter model,
the learner is assumed to simultaneously entertain a limited number of hypotheses (called particles) about the values of parameters in the
environment (in the limit, with an increasing number of particles, the filter approaches optimal Bayesian decision-making). This contrasts
with the Bayesian change detection approach, where learners are assumed to maintain full uncertainty about the estimates of the volatility
(i.e., α in Box 1) and state (i.e., θ in Box 1) parameters. Thus, the particle filter has been argued to approximate rationality in the literature
(Sanborn et al., 2010). At the beginning of the learning process, random values of θ are assigned to the particles since the learner has not
made any observation of the environment. Each particle is then repeatedly updated according to subsequent observations. If a particle
reflects a theory of the environment that is consistent with a new observation, then it is likely to be retained. Otherwise, the particle
is likely to be reset and its value resampled from the hypothesis space. Since this sampling process is stochastic, there is always some
chance that a few particles are inconsistent with the current state of the environment. These inconsistent particles are useful for detecting
context changes in the environment. When the learner encounters an unexpected observation, particles that used to be consistent with
the previous context now need to be reset, while those that were previously inconsistent are retained and duplicated, thus achieving the
goal of detecting changes.
While we are not aware of any study directly testing the different predictions made by the change detection and the particle filter mod-
els, one crucial difference exists between them. The particle filter model, due to its stochastic nature and its sensitivity to the order of
sequential observations, is suited for predicting individual-level results (Brown and Steyvers, 2009; Yi and Steyvers, 2009; Frankenhuis and
Panchanathan, 2011). The change detection model, because its goal is to characterize rational behaviors, is suited for predicting average
behavior. Patterns of individual learning outcomes tend to be different from group-averaged learning outcomes (Newell et al., 2001; Gallistel
et al., 2004). Particle filter models can readily accommodate such differences – a single run of a sequential sampler tends to yield unpre-
dictable patterns, but the average of many runs, by definition, reflects the expected properties of the probability distribution that is being
sampled from (see Daw and Courville, 2008, for a similar argument).
forth between a certain set of contexts, without relearning a causal
model each time a previously encountered context is active (for
example, becoming familiar with a foreign accent does not lead to
a complete relearning of one’s native accent). It is impossible for
learners to display such behaviors without, implicitly or explicitly,
representing multiple contexts concurrently. In the domain of
category learning, several connectionist networks, such as the
ALCOVE model (Kruschke, 1992) and the SUSTAIN model (Love
et al., 2004), and incremental Bayesian non-parametric mod-
els (Anderson, 1991) are both capable of representing multiple
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categories that are learned through sequential observations. Sim-
ilarly, a theory that extends the representation of multiple cate-
gories to multiple contexts must also include a hypothesis about
how these contexts are stored.
3.2. A BAG OF CONTEXTS?
Nevertheless, more behavioral and theoretical studies are needed
to understand whether learners optimally represent learned mod-
els of past contexts, as would be predicted by a theory of a rational
learner. When a past context has little to no chance of reappear-
ing in the future, it seems unnecessary to store its information in
memory (c.f. Anderson and Schooler, 1991). When a past con-
text is quite common overall, or when a repetitive pattern of
environmental changes has appeared, learners will benefit greatly
if its information remains readily available through the learning
process. In addition, in order to efficiently retrieve a causal model
of a past context from memory, the learner must implement mech-
anisms that support the identification of familiar contexts. In the
case where there are observable cues co-occurring with the advent
of contexts, it is possible to index contexts with these cues for later
retrieval. This is especially helpful as most contexts do not come
with explicit labels – the use of co-occurring cues may serve as the
functional labels for these contexts. As memory indices, contex-
tual cues make the information learned in each context more easily
retrievable (García-Gutiérrez and Rosas, 2003; Rosas and Callejas-
Aguilera, 2006; Abad et al., 2009), and keep multiple contexts from
interfering with one another (Lewandowsky and Kirsner, 2000;
Yang and Lewandowsky, 2003). In the case where there are no cues
whatsoever, we expect learners to have a more difficult time iden-
tifying familiar contexts, potentially because such identification
would have to solely rely on assessing the fit of multiple existing
models to observable data.
These types of optimal learning decisions call for a sophisti-
cated theory that, in our opinion, must extend beyond a process of
parameter or structural revision of a single causal model. This is
because at the end of the day, the outcome of the learning process
should be more than a snapshot of the latest context of the envi-
ronment, but rather an organized body of knowledge summarizing
various forms of causal relations in the environment, past, and
present. We outline such a model – in the form of a Bayesian
hierarchical model – in the next section. Finding the answers to
these questions can greatly supplement our understanding of how
animals and humans learn multiple causal models for multiple
contexts to solve a particular task through sequential observations.
4. A HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LEARNING IN
MULTI-CONTEXT ENVIRONMENTS
The hierarchical Bayesian modeling framework has been success-
fully applied to a wide range of cognitive phenomena (e.g., Kemp
et al., 2007; Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008; also see Lee, 2011, for a
review). In fact, most existing Bayesian models of change detection
fall into the category of hierarchical models, where the volatility
parameter is treated as a hyper-parameter (Behrens et al., 2007;
and most notably the nested volatility model in Wilson et al.,
2010). While we also advocate a hierarchical Bayesian approach
for modeling learning behaviors in a multi-context environment,
our primary goal is to understand whether the learner forms a
hierarchical representation of the environment. Previous model-
ing efforts, on the other hand, have typically emphasized the issue
of whether and how learners can dynamically adapt their strate-
gies when contexts change. We argue that only when a generative
model simultaneously represents multiple contexts and their cor-
responding causal models, will the ideal learner be able to attribute
unexpected observations to the right sources, and retain and reuse
causal models from past contexts (see Kording et al., 2007, for
similar ideas).
Figure 1 shows one possible realization of such a hierarchi-
cal representation. For simplicity, consider an example where the
causal models differ across contexts only in their parameter val-
ues, shown as θ1, θ2, θ3, . . . θn in the figure (bold symbols denote
vectors of variables). There are three components in this hierar-
chical representation. The first component (highlighted in blue)
consists of the contexts and causal models, each of which describes
a theory of how the observations of interest y i are generated from
the parameters θ. Importantly, the parameters of the causal model
of each context are individually represented, thus allowing for the
storage of multiple contexts and avoiding catastrophic interference
between these contexts. The second component is the mechanism
that infers the identity of the currently active context ci (high-
lighted in red). This decision process in turn depends on two
variables: the hyper-parameter αci , which reflects the likelihood of
context ci coming into effect without explicit cues, and the inferred
identity of the previously encountered context ci−1. The identity
of the currently active context corresponds to only one of the causal
models (i.e., one of θ1, θ2, θ3, . . . θn). Thus, once the identity of the
current context has been correctly inferred (which might not be
true due to the probabilistic nature of the model), it can prevent
the irrelevant contexts from being used to explain the observed
data y i or being revised to fit unrelated data. In other words, the
dependence between y i and ci, as shown in the figure, serves as a
regulator that chooses the appropriate context as needed.
yi
θ1 θ2 θ3 θn
ci
ci− 1
αci
φ3φ1 φ2 φn
ui
context priors
and identities
contextual cues
i observations
FIGURE 1 | One potential hierarchical model for representing
information learned in a multi-context environment.
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The third component in the hierarchical representation is the
optional cuing mechanism (highlighted in green). When covary-
ing cues ui are available, the values of these cues will depend on
the identity of the contexts and the causal relations between con-
texts and these cues (the effect of φ on ui). Therefore, these cues,
in theory, serve the same functional purpose as the observations
of interest y – evidence for inferring the identity of the current
context. There is a vast literature on how humans may be able to
optimally combine two sources of information to perform infer-
ences (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Knill, 2007; Toscano and McMurray,
2010, to name a few). By building this cueing mechanism into the
hierarchical representation, we are also making the assumption
that learners should take advantage of the covarying cues as an
extra source of information when available.
To be clear, Figure 1 is only meant to illustrate one of the
many possible ways of constructing a hierarchical model to cap-
ture context-sensitive learning. Many details, such as the prior for
the appropriate number of θ variables and any hyper-parameter
reflecting the relationships between them, are not shown in the
figure. Our goal here is to provide a concrete sense of what a
hierarchical framework may look like for future modeling efforts.
Experimental studies, especially those designed to test the effect
of recognizing past contexts, are needed to further tease apart the
factors that affect learning in a multi-context environment.
5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SINGLE-CONTEXT LABORATORY
EXPERIMENTS
If animal and human subjects can readily detect new contexts
without being explicitly instructed to do so, then we have reason
to suspect that subjects will involuntarily look for context changes
even in laboratory experiments where subjects are expected to
learn a causal model for a fixed but unknown context. In a variety
of such behavioral tasks, subjects exhibit an automatic and seem-
ingly suboptimal behavior: they put an undue emphasis on the
sequence of past observations, even when these observed stimuli
are independent samples from the same causal model. Two notable
instances of such suboptimal behavior in the literature are the hot
hand illusion (Gilovich et al., 1985) and the tendency of reinforcing
local patterns (e.g., Cho et al., 2002; Maloney et al., 2005; Gökaydin
et al., 2011). While the conventional interpretation is that learners
are irrational in that they perceive spurious correlations between
past and upcoming outcomes, these seemingly suboptimal behav-
iors may well be the result of learners automatically inferring
multiple contexts (e.g., hot hand context versus cold hand con-
text) from the sequential input (for similar opinions, see Jones and
Sieck, 2003; Yu and Cohen, 2008; Green et al., 2010; Wilder et al.,
2010). More generally, the bias for perceiving multiple contexts
may also hold the key to explaining order effects in learning (e.g.,
Sakamoto et al., 2008; Rottman and Keil, 2012). At the same time,
it raises the concern that such a bias may lead to misinterpreted
experimental findings because participants readily adapt to what
they perceive to be changes in contexts (perhaps subconsciously).
The above cited studies are in fact the best examples to show that
the use of balanced designs in experiments do not effectively pre-
vent participants from “inappropriately” adopting this bias (see
Jaeger, 2010 for similar discussions).
6. CONCLUSION
Recognizing context changes in the environment helps learners
build or choose the appropriate causal model and make accurate
predictions about the consequences of their actions. In this arti-
cle, we have addressed several questions about what we believe is
the canonical case of learning: when the changes in context are
implicit rather than being explicitly noted by a “teacher.” Current
research findings suggest that learners are able to resolve con-
textual ambiguity and thereby recognize a new context by only
observing sequential input, albeit with some limitations. Recog-
nizing a new context is, however, only a part of the bigger picture.
How do learners store the causal models of past contexts? Can
learners reuse previously learned causal models? Crucially, given a
change in context, should the learner build a new causal model or
try to reuse, and potentially update, an old one? How should the
learner decide? It is important to consider these questions when
one attempts to define the expected behaviors of a rational naïve
learner. We hope to address these intriguing questions in future
research.
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